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that remain within an FTA are often the highest tariffs that the countries apply on an MFN basis.  
It seems plausible that such exclusions may be chosen because the domestic producers of these 
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I. Introduction 
 Almost all participants in free trade agreements (FTAs) exclude at least a few 
products or sectors from complete tariff removal on the exports of their FTA partners.  
The positive tariffs that remain within an FTA are often the highest tariffs that the 
countries apply on an MFN basis.  This paper documents the use of exemptions across a 
large number of FTAs and attempts to explain how these exempted sectors are selected. 
 One explanation that seems plausible is that such exclusions are chosen because 
the domestic producers of these products are viewed as especially vulnerable to 
competition from imports from the partner country. In brief, they are especially “sensitive 
sectors.”  We find evidence for this explanation, but only in a subset of countries, 
primarily the most developed countries.  To the extent that exempted sectors are 
sensitive, their exclusion from tariff reduction eliminates products for which the FTA 
would otherwise have been “trade creating,” in the terminology of Viner (1950).  
                                                 
*
We have benefited from discussions of an earlier paper on this topic with Ibrahim 
Gunay, Chris Magee, and participants at the 27th International Conference of The 
International Trade and Finance Association, Poznan, in 2017.  This paper has benefitted 
in addition from comments by Peter Neary. 
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Therefore this exemption of sensitive sectors reduces the likelihood that the FTA will be 
beneficial in terms of overall welfare. Grossman and Helpman (1995) make this point 
formally, noting that the very exemptions can make FTAs more viable politically are also 
likely to reduce aggregate social welfare by primarily increasing trade diversion rather 
than trade creation. However, since we find evidence for exempted sectors being 
sensitive only in developed countries, other explanations for their selection must be 
sought. 
 Additional explanations include the following:  Countries may exclude sectors out 
of concern for lost tariff revenue, especially if the benefits from including these sectors 
would be small. While there seems to be no systematic evidence on how common it is for 
countries to consider tariff revenue loss in selecting excluded products, Fontagné et al. 
(2011) note that excluding products for this reason is one of the two approaches included 
the guidelines of the EU’s Directorate-General for Trade. In addition to revenue 
considerations, countries may also succumb to pressure from their FTA partners not to 
exclude sensitive sectors that they would otherwise exempt, based on the interest of those 
partners if they are large and powerful, leaving sectors to be excluded only if they are of 
little interest to the partner country. We find some evidence consistent with both of these 
explanations. 
 Using a simple partial equilibrium theoretical model of an FTA, we first examine 
how these several motivations for exempting sectors play out in that model, and how they 
relate to the effects that the FTA will have on welfare as captured by Viner’s (1950) 
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. This analysis also motivates a simple 
measure of an FTA’s potential for trade diversion relative to trade creation: the share of 
 3 
third-country trade in a given product. Using this measure, we perform an empirical 
analysis of the available data on FTAs and their exempted sectors. For this analysis, we 
use a global tariff database that exhaustively takes FTAs into account. 
 There are relatively few empirical studies of the determinants of exemptions in 
FTAs. Related our work, Ollareaga and Soloaga (1998) and Gawande et al. (2002) find 
evidence for Mercosur that deviations from internal free trade are more likely in sectors 
with greater potential for trade creation. Relative to this existing work, we study a much 
broader range of countries and FTAs and are therefore able to highlight the considerable 
global heterogeneity in the reasons for FTA exemptions. We are able to do this both 
because of the comprehensive global tariff database we employ and because the measure 
of trade diversion relative to trade creation we derive can be computed using only trade 
data that is readily available for most countries. 
 
II. Theory 
 Appendix A sets out and solves a partial equilibrium model of trade and tariffs 
among three countries, A, B, and C, with country A importing from the other two. 
Suppose that country A initially levies an MFN tariff, 𝑡, on both B and C, then forms an 
FTA with only B so that its tariff on B is eliminated.  From the solution in Appendix A, 
we get the prices of the good in country A before and after the formation of the FTA: 
 𝑝0
𝐴 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
(𝑏𝐵+𝑏𝐶)𝑡
𝛽
 (1) 
 𝑝1
𝐴 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐶𝑡
𝛽
 (2) 
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where 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, is the slope of country 𝑖’s export supply or import demand, 𝛽 =
∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛾 = ∑ 𝑏
𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖  with 𝑎
𝑖 the autarky price in country 𝑖.  From this the change in 
price in country A is simply 
 ∆𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝1
𝐴 − 𝑝0
𝐴 = –
𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
 (3) 
Note that this result, and those below that follow from it, depends on the 
assumption of the model in Appendix A that both countries B and C export positive 
quantities to country A in both equilibria.1 
 It is the price change in (3) that primarily determines how much the FTA 
disrupts the domestic industry producing this product in country A.  This depends 
primarily on the size of the tariff, but also on 𝑏𝑖 𝛽⁄ , which under additional 
assumptions laid out in Appendix A is simply country B’s share in the world 
economy. 
Trade Creation and Diversion 
 We can use the model solution (A-14) in Appendix A to find the change in 
country A’s imports due to the FTA: 
 𝑀0
𝐴 =  
𝑏𝐴[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑎𝐵−𝑡)+𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐴−𝑎𝐶−𝑡)]
𝛽
 (4) 
 𝑀1
𝐴 =  
𝑏𝐴[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑎𝐵)+𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐴−𝑎𝐶−𝑡)]
𝛽
 (5) 
 ∆𝑀𝐴 = 𝑀1
𝐴 − 𝑀0
𝐴 =
𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
  (6) 
                                                 
1 While this model implies that the importing country faces an upward sloping foreign 
export supply curve and therefore is “large” in the traditional sense, we think of the 
upward sloping export supply more broadly as a way of capturing factors that are not 
explicitly in the model such as Armington-type product differentiation, imperfect 
competition, or exporter rents due to firm heterogeneity (Sharma, 2018). 
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This increase in imports of country A is a measure of Viner’s (1950) “trade creation,” the 
beneficial portion of the effect of the FTA on the importing country.  We denote it 𝑇𝐶, 
and note that it depends almost solely on the price change in (3): 
 𝑇𝐶 = ∆𝑀𝐴 =
𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
= −𝑏𝐴∆𝑝𝐴  (7) 
Thus the beneficial effect of the FTA is directly related to the price change that disrupts 
the competing domestic industry.  This is because the gain from an FTA, like any 
comparative-advantage-based gain from trade, arises from replacing domestic production 
with lower-cost imports.  Thus the more that a country stands to gain from an FTA in a 
sector, the more those working in that sector will resist the FTA and request that they be 
exempted from its tariff reductions. 
 We can also use the solutions (A-15) and (A-16) to get the changes in exports 
from countries B and C: 
 𝑋0
𝐵 =
𝑏𝑩[𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴–𝑎𝐵–𝑡)+𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐶–𝑎𝐵)]
𝛽
 (8) 
 𝑋1
𝐵 =
𝑏𝑩[𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴–𝑎𝐵)+𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐶+𝑡–𝑎𝐵)]
𝛽
 (9) 
 ∆𝑋𝐵 = 𝑋1
𝐵 − 𝑋0
𝐵 =
𝑏𝑩(𝑏𝐶+𝑏𝐴)𝑡
𝛽
 > 0  (10) 
 𝑋0
𝐶 =
𝑏𝑪[𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴–𝑎𝐶–𝑡)+𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐵–𝑎𝐶)]
𝛽
 (11) 
 𝑋1
𝐶 =
𝑏𝑪[𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴–𝑎𝐶–𝑡)+𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐵–𝑎𝐶−𝑡)]
𝛽
 (12) 
 ∆𝑋𝐶 = 𝑋1
𝐶 − 𝑋0
𝐶 = −
𝑏𝑪𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
< 0  (13) 
As must be true,  ∆𝑋𝐵 = ∆𝑀𝐴 − ∆𝑋𝐶 .  That is, the increase in exports from partner 
country B combines the increase in imports of country A and the reduction in 
imports from country C.  The latter is Viner’s “trade diversion,” the trade that 
country A was doing before but that is now coming from partner country B instead 
of country C.  As Viner taught us, trade diversion is harmful to the importing country 
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A because it is substituting a higher cost source for a lower cost source.  But note too 
that this trade diversion, though harmful to country A as a whole, has no adverse 
effect on A’s competing producers.  They are harmed only by trade creation. 
 Letting 𝑇𝐷 denote trade diversion, we have  
 𝑇𝐷 = −∆𝑋𝐶 =
𝑏𝑪𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
= −𝑏𝑪∆𝑝𝐴  (14) 
Thus the harmful aggregate effect of the FTA in this industry also depends on its price 
change, but here it is scaled by 𝑏𝑪, which reflects the size of the economy outside of the 
FTA.  Together these also allow us to compare trade creation and trade diversion:  
 
𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝐷
=
𝑏𝐴
𝑏𝐶
  (15) 
It is not the case that 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐷 directly measure the associated welfare effects, so 
we cannot infer the net welfare effect of an FTA in a sector from whether 
𝑇𝐶 𝑇𝐷 > 1⁄ .  However, the valid message is that the country is more likely to gain 
from the FTA in the sector the higher is 𝑏𝐴 (and thus the larger is country A) and the 
smaller is 𝑏𝐶  (and thus the smaller is the rest-of-world). 
 
Domestic Markets and Injury 
Letting 𝑆𝐴 = 𝑠𝐴(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) be the domestic supply function in country A, as in (A-18a) in 
Appendix A, the change in producer surplus is 
 ∆𝑃𝑆𝐴 = 𝑆0
𝑖 ∆𝑝𝑖 +
𝑠𝑖
2
(∆𝑝𝑖)
2
 (16) 
Using (7) this becomes 
 ∆𝑃𝑆𝐴 = −𝑆0
𝐴 𝑇𝐶
𝑏𝐴
+
𝑠𝐴
2
(
𝑇𝐶
𝑏𝐴
)
2
< 0 (17) 
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where the sign follows from keeping supply non-negative.2 As expected, holding 𝑆0
𝐴 
fixed, the loss of producer surplus increases with increasing trade creation: 
 
𝑑∆𝑃𝑆𝐴
𝑑𝑇𝐶
= −
𝑆0
𝐴
𝑏𝐴
+ 2
𝑠𝐴
2
𝑇𝐶
𝑏𝐴
2 = −
𝑆0
𝐴
𝑏𝐴
−
𝑠𝐴∆𝑝𝐴
𝑏𝐴
= −
𝑆1
𝐴
𝑏𝐴
< 0 (18) 
 
Tariff Revenue 
The change in country A’s tariff revenue includes both the reduced revenue from 
reduced imports from country C and the complete loss of the original tariff revenue 
from country B.  This is  
 ∆𝑅𝐴 = 𝑡∆𝑋𝐶 − 𝑡𝑋0
𝐵 = −𝑡(𝑇𝐷 + 𝑋0
𝐵) (19) 
Thus country A stands to lose all of the tariff that it initially collects on imports from 
country B, plus the tariff rate times the quantity of trade diversion.  For any given 
values of initial trade, the loss of tariff revenue increases with trade diversion. 
 
Welfare 
 Private sector welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  Their 
net can be inferred from a country’s import demand or export supply curve, as the 
change in net surplus is the area to the left of these curves between prices, positive 
for a price increase to exporters and negative to importers.  Therefore, the change in 
net private surplus for country A is 
                                                 
2
An equivalent version of (17) is ∆𝑃𝑆𝐴 = −𝑆1
𝐴 𝑇𝐶
𝑏𝐴
−
𝑠𝐴
2
(
𝑇𝐶
𝑏𝐴
)
2
, which is clearly negative 
for 𝑆1
𝐴 ≥ 0, but which varies with 𝑆1
𝐴 and thus with the size of the tariff. 
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∆𝑁𝑆𝐴 = −
𝑀1
𝐴 + 𝑀0
𝑖
2
∆𝑝𝐴 = −
𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑝1
𝐴) + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑝0
𝐴)
2
∆𝑝𝐴 
= −𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐴∆𝑝𝐴 +
𝑏𝐴(∆𝑝𝐴)2
2
= 𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐴
𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐴
2
(
𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝛽
)
2
 
      = (𝑎𝐴 +
𝑏𝐵𝑡
2𝛽
) 𝑇𝐶 (20) 
where we have used (A-2), (3), and (7) in the first, second, and third lines 
respectively.  Combining this with the change in government revenue from (19) we 
have the change in total welfare of country A: 
 ∆𝑊𝐴 = (𝑎𝐴 +
𝑏𝐵𝑡
2𝛽
) 𝑇𝐶 − 𝑡𝑇𝐷 − 𝑡𝑋0
𝐵  (21) 
That is, the FTA has the following effects on total welfare of importing country A: 
 A gain in net private-sector surplus due to trade creation, 
 A loss of tariff revenue on imports from the outside country due to trade 
diversion, and 
 The complete loss of the tariff revenue it was getting on imports from the 
partner country. 
 
On this basis, one might hope that countries would select products to exempt from 
tariff cuts if they would be more likely to cause trade diversion than trade creation, 
since the former is harmful and the latter beneficial in terms of aggregate welfare.  
We do not expect aggregate welfare to motivate countries, however, since if it did 
they would opt for multilateral free trade, not FTAs. 
 
Graph 
 We illustrate these aggregate welfare effects in Figure 1 which is simplified 
compared to the above by having countries B and C share the same export function.  
This avoids having to draw them separately.   
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 In the left panel are the common export supply curves of countries B and C, 
one without a tariff, t, and the higher one with the tariff, which is treated as 
increasing the cost of export.  Their horizontal sums are in the right panel, yielding 
the equilibrium prices in country A, 𝑝0
𝐴 without the FTA and 𝑝1
𝐴 with it.  These prices 
then determine the quantities imported and exported by each country, including the 
fall of exports by country C as trade diversion, TD, and the rise of imports by country 
A as trade creation, TC.  These two must add to the increase in exports by country B, 
as is also shown in the left panel. 
 The welfare effects from equation (21) are then easily observed.  The gain 
due to trade creation is the green area to the left of the import demand curve in the 
right panel.  The two losses of tariff revenue are shown in the left as red-bordered 
rectangles, one for country B’s entire initial exports and a second whose width is the 
amount of trade diversion.  As usual due to the second-best nature of an FTA, the net 
of the gain and the losses may be of either sign. 
 One might ask why trade diversion should be harmful in the context here, 
where both exporters share the same export supply curves and therefore cost 
structures.3  The original idea of trade diversion as formulated by Viner had 
exporting countries with different costs, and trade diversion would only happen if a 
country formed an FTA with a higher cost exporter.  Here, with upward sloping 
supply curves, costs are variable, and in the initial equilibrium country A is 
importing from both at the same price and therefore at the same marginal cost.  The 
                                                 
3 Indeed, Peter Neary did ask this.  Hence this discussion. 
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FTA causes country A to import more from country B, which moves up its supply 
curve to higher marginal cost, while it imports less from country C which moves the 
other way, to lower marginal cost.  Indeed, one can use the areas under the two 
export supply curves to measure the total costs of the exports diverted from C to B, 
and this area is necessarily larger for B.  Thus it is again true, as with Viner but in a 
different context, that trade diversion involves substituting higher cost imports for 
lower cost imports. 
 
III. Exempted Sectors 
 From (18) and (19) we see two alternative rationales for exempting sectors 
from the tariff cuts of an FTA.  If the country is most concerned about the disruption 
that will be caused to domestic industry, then it will exempt those sectors where the 
effects of the FTA will be most trade creating.  These are the sectors we have 
described as “sensitive sectors” in earlier work.  Such concern about industry 
disruption could be based on concern for the well-being of disrupted workers and 
firms, or it may be a reflection of their political influence. 
 Alternatively, countries may be more concerned about the role of tariff 
revenue in the government budget.  If so, (19) suggests that they will seek to exempt 
those sectors where the FTA is more likely to divert trade than to create it.  And in 
addition, they will avoid exempting sectors where tariff revenue from the partner 
country is initially high, because of a high tariff rate and/or a high level of exports 
from that country.  
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 Our analysis focuses on A’s incentives to exclude a particular sector from an 
FTA, but it is also natural to ask what B’s incentives as an exporter might be. In this 
model, the increase in B’s surplus due to an FTA depends only on the increase in B’s 
exports to A and not on the extent to which the increase in exports is due to trade 
creation or trade diversion. This is because a given increase in exports – whether 
from trade creation or diversion – corresponds to a specific movement along B’s 
export supply curve and therefore a specific increase in B’s surplus. However, as we 
elaborate in Section VI, to the extent that sectors in B that already export a 
substantial amount to A are able to exert pressure to open up A’s market in those 
sectors, we might expect A to face pressure from B to not exclude relatively trade 
creating sectors. 
 In our empirical analysis below, we use a simple predictor of trade creation 
and trade diversion, in addition to other variables, to sort out how these motives 
appear to have influenced the selection of exempted sectors in FTAs. 
 
Predictor of Trade Creation vs. Trade Diversion 
To obtain a simple and intuitive predictor of the extent of trade creation vs. 
diversion for use in our empirical analysis, we can first define two elasticities. Let 𝜂𝐴 
be (minus) the elasticity of demand for imports and 𝜀𝐶  be the elasticity of supply of 
exports by country C, then: 
 𝜂𝐴 = −
𝑑𝑀𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
𝑝𝐴
𝑀𝐴
= 𝑏𝐴
𝑝𝐴
𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴−𝑝𝐴)
=
𝑝𝐴
(𝑎𝐴−𝑝𝐴)
 (22) 
 𝜀𝐶 =
𝑑𝑋𝐶
𝑑𝑝𝐶
𝑝𝐶
𝑋𝐶
= 𝑏𝐶
𝑝𝐶
𝑏𝐶(𝑝𝐶−𝑎𝐶)
=
𝑝𝐶
(𝑝𝐶−𝑎𝐶)
 (23) 
Then 
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𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝐷
=
𝑏𝐴
𝑏𝑪
=
𝑀𝐴
𝑋𝐶
𝑝𝐶−𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐴−𝑝𝐴
=
𝑀𝐴
𝑋𝐶
𝜂𝐴
𝜀𝐶
𝑝𝐶
𝑝𝐴
 (24) 
where the last equality above uses (23). We see from this expression that the extent 
of trade creation relative to trade diversion is inversely related to the ratio 
𝑋𝐶
𝑀𝐴
, 
which is country A’s share of non-FTA trade in its imports of the product.  This is an 
intuitive measure of the potential for trade creation relative to trade diversion 
because if the third country share were very small, an FTA would be likely to cause 
substantial trade creation but would not have much scope for causing trade 
diversion. By contrast, if the third country share were large, there would be much 
greater scope for an FTA to cause trade diversion. We will therefore focus our 
analysis on this simple predictor of trade creation relative to trade diversion. 4 
 While this relationship between the trade creation to trade diversion ratio 
and the third country share is derived here in the context of a model with linear 
export supply and import demand curves, the approach taken here is in fact quite a 
bit more general. For example, it can be extended to the case with a general export 
supply and import demand curves in a straightforward manner. To see this, we can 
consider the incremental trade creation and diversion caused by a small reduction 
in the tariff rate on a PTA partner:  
𝑇𝐶′
𝑇𝐷′
=
𝑑𝑀𝐴
𝑑𝑋𝐶
=
𝑀𝐴
𝑋𝐶
𝜂𝐴
𝜀𝐶
𝑝𝐶
𝑝𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐶
=
𝑀𝐴
𝑋𝐶
𝜂𝐴
𝜀𝐶
𝑑 (
𝑝𝐴
𝑝𝐶
). Hence, a 
version of the relationship we derived for the linear case immediately holds for 
small changes even with this greater level of generality. 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, and almost equivalently, we could considered as a measure TC as a 
fraction of the total increase in trade between countries A and B. Since the total increase 
in trade between A and B would be TC+TD, this type of alternative measure would be 
very closely related to ours, i.e. 
𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝐶+𝑇𝐷
=
1
1+𝑇𝐷/𝑇𝐶
. 
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 The role of the key term  
𝑀𝐴
𝑋𝐶
 would even extend even to a model with 
differentiated products. For example, Jammes and Ollareaga (2005) provide trade 
creation and trade diversion formulas for a partial equilibrium model with products 
that are differentiated according to the exporting country. It is easy to verify that the 
ratio of trade creation to trade diversion based on their formulas would again entail 
the term  
𝑀𝐴
𝑋𝐶
  and two elasticities, though in their context, one of those elasticities 
would be the elasticity of substitution between foreign varieties rather than the 
export supply elasticity as in our framework. This degree of generality is perhaps 
not surprising in light of the simple intuition we provided linking the relative 
prevalence of trade creation vs. trade diversion to the third country share. 
IV. Empirical Specification 
Motivated by the theory from Section II, we are interested in studying whether 
products are more likely to be excluded from an FTA when there is a greater potential for 
trade creation vs. trade diversion. We will specifically consider an empirical specification 
that takes the following form: 
𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑝 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑝, 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑝 is a binary variable that records whether product 𝑝 is an excluded product in 
an FTA between importer 𝑖 and exporter 𝑗. The main independent variable of interest is 
𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝, our measure of the extent of trade creation relative to diversion in this product.  
Following (22), for country i in an FTA with country j, 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝 is country i's imports of 
product p from non-FTA countries other than country j as a fraction of country i's imports 
of product p from those countries as well as country j.  For simplicity we call this country 
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i's "third-country share" in its FTA with country j.  This measure excludes from both the 
numerator and denominator imports from countries in FTAs that were either already in 
place prior to the agreement between importer 𝑖 and exporter 𝑗, or that are concurrent.5 
Since the decision to exclude a product is itself likely to affect the trade flows between 
two partners, we calculate 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝 using trade flows prior to the FTA between 𝑖 and exporter 
𝑗. We specifically use an average of the three years preceding the FTA so as to also help 
smooth out fluctuations related to business cycles.  
In addition to  𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝, our specification also includes importer-exporter fixed effects, 
𝛿𝑖𝑗, which ensure that our regression estimates compare products within a given importer-
exporter pair. With these fixed effects, our regression estimates will effectively capture 
an average of the relationship between the third country share and the likelihood of a 
product being excluded in each of the country-pairs we study. In addition to importer-
exporter fixed effects, we will also consider robustness tests that also include product 
fixed effects. 
 Given the broad range of countries and FTAs that are present in our sample, it 
will be useful to examine any potential heterogeneity in the effects that we identify 
through our baseline specification. To do this, we will make use of interaction terms so 
that we have empirical specifications of the following form: 
𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑝 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽2(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝 × 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑝) + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑝, 
where 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑝 is a vector of characteristics that we interact with 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝.  As this notation 
suggests, these characteristics could potentially depend on the importer, exporter and 
                                                 
5 As a robustness test, we also use a measure that includes all trade in the denominator, 
including trade with existing FTA partners. 
 15 
product, though they may also vary in only one of those dimensions (e.g. only at the 
importer level). These interaction terms will shed light on the determinants of the 
relationship between 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑝 and 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑝. 
 
V. Data 
For our empirical analysis, we require data on tariff rates under preferential trade 
agreements. While standard sources of trade data such as the UNCTAD TRAINS and the 
WTO-IDB should in principle contain this information, these data tend to have very 
incomplete coverage of FTAs and often report MFN tariff rates as the applied tariff even 
when there are in reality separate preferential tariffs. We overcome these limitations of 
the standard sources of tariff data by using a unique global tariff database from CEPII 
(Guimbard et al., 2012) that provides bilateral tariff rates at the six-digit HS product level 
for a large number of countries while exhaustively taking into account preferential trade 
agreements. 6 These data are available in the form of three-year averages for 2000-2002, 
2003-2005, 2006-2008 and 2009-2011.  
In determining whether a product is excluded from an FTA or not, we simply 
consider whether the applied tariff rate is positive in the latest available period, i.e. in 
2009-2011. We will focus on FTAs that entered into force in 2005 or earlier so that these 
agreements have had at least some time to phase in. It is possible that some of the 
products that we identify as excluded are provisioned to eventually move towards a zero 
tariff rate under the FTA. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between such cases and 
                                                 
6 Our analysis excludes trade in services because of the lack of adequate trade policy 
information at this level of detail. Conceptually, the trade diversion concerns in relation 
to FTA exemptions should also apply in some form to trade in services. 
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cases where the tariff rate will remain positive in perpetuity, but it seems reasonable to 
consider a product that will retain a positive tariff for a relatively long period of time to 
still be an excluded product in a somewhat broader sense of the term. 
 In addition to tariff data, our analysis also requires trade data at the six-digit HS-
level. While the HS trade data from UNCOMTRADE technically are available starting in 
1988, they only become available for a broad set of countries in the early to mid 1990s. 
With this in mind, we use trade data from 1995 onward. We specifically use a version of 
UNCOMTRADE from CEPII that uses a statistical procedure to weight either the 
importer- or the exporter-reported data according to an estimated reliability level. Dealing 
with mirror data in this relatively thorough manner is likely to be useful for us, given that 
we have a broad range of countries covered in our database, including some that may 
have less precisely reported trade data.  
Since we use trade data averaged over three years prior to an FTA coming into 
force, our sample will then only include FTAs that enter into force in 1998 or later. As 
just discussed, in order to give some time for an agreement to phase in, we also only 
include agreements up to 2005. We also impose several additional restrictions. First, we 
only include importers and exporters that have a population of at least 1 million during 
the entire 1995-2005 period. Second, we drop observations where exporter 𝑗 does not 
export to importer 𝑖 at all in the product in question, since there would then be no 
possibility of trade diversion as defined in our theoretical framework. We drop the E.U. 
member countries as importers because of their common external tariffs, but we include 
them as exporters. For other customs unions, we still include each country separately 
because these customs unions have not fully implemented common external tariffs and so 
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there is still likely to be substantial variation in tariffs at the level of an importing 
country. We also drop observations where the MFN tariff was already equal to zero when 
the FTA came into force since the FTA would then cause neither trade creation nor 
diversion. In order to determine MFN tariff rates, we use data from TRAINS, which 
contains information on several years predating the period in which we have tariff data 
from CEPII. Finally, we drop importer-exporter pairs where no product is excluded from 
the tariff cuts and also those where more than 50% of products are excluded. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics on our final sample, which includes a 
total of 37 importing countries and 240 importer-exporter pairs. While some countries 
have an agreement with a single partner, others have agreements with several dozen. Our 
sample includes a wide range of countries and includes a reasonable mix of high-, 
middle- and low-income countries. We can see from Table 1 that the fraction of excluded 
products in this sample ranges from about 0.03 for Malawi to 0.44 for the Philippines, 
with an average of about 0.16. Table 1 also reveals that the fraction of the total bilateral 
trade that is exempted – calculated based on three-year averages prior to the FTA coming 
into force – tends to be somewhat greater than the fraction of exempted products for most 
countries. As a result, the average value of this variable across the countries in our 
sample is about 0.20, suggesting that a substantial amount of trade is excluded from 
FTAs. 
 
VI. Results 
We can now turn to the main results of our empirical analysis. Table 2 shows the 
results from the baseline analysis. From Column 1, we see that for the entire sample of 
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countries, the effect of the third country share on the likelihood of a product being 
exempted is positive and significant. The magnitude of the estimates implies that moving 
the third-country share from 0 to 1 would increase the probability of a product being 
exempted by about 6.5 percentage points. Recalling from (22) that the third-country share 
is positively related to trade diversion, this result suggests that, on average over the whole 
sample, a product is more likely to be exempted when there is a greater scope for trade 
diversion rather for than creation. 
This result masks considerable heterogeneity across countries. Columns 2 and 3 
repeat this analysis on samples of high-income (OECD) countries and non-high-income 
countries. We see that there is a substantial negative effect for high-income countries and 
a positive effect for other countries. The negative effect is consistent with the discussion 
in Deardorff (2017), who suggests that excluded products are ones that are sensitive and 
so are the ones where there is a greater scope for trade creation rather than trade 
diversion. 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 repeat this analysis using a slightly different measure of the 
third country share. In this case, we include all exporters that will enter into an FTA with 
the importer in the same year as the exporter under consideration in the denominator 
when calculating the third country share. This specification helps account for cases where 
an importer may provide the same market access to all exporters entering into an FTA in 
the same year. This might be the case especially when multiple exporters are part of the 
same trade agreement. Since the third country share measured this way less often takes a 
value of 1, it also allows us to test the robustness our analysis on a somewhat larger 
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number of importer-exporter-product combinations. As we see from Columns 4-5, these 
results are very consistent with those from Columns 1-3. 
Our results in Table 2 raise the question of why products with high third country 
shares are less likely to be exempted only in high-income countries. We consider two 
potential reasons for this. First, developing countries tend to rely on tariffs as a source of 
government revenue to a much greater extent than do developed countries. That being the 
case, these governments may have a stronger incentive to keep positive tariffs on trade 
diverting sectors so as to avoid the unnecessary loss of government revenue shown in 
(19).  
A second potential reason is that developing countries may have less bargaining 
power when forming FTAs and so have to open up rather than protect industries where 
substantial trade creation is more likely. Plausibly, when an agreement between A and B 
is being negotiated, sectors in B that already export a substantial amount to A would be 
especially involved in trying to ensure that A opens up its market in these sectors. Such 
sectors would generally be ones with a substantial potential for trade creation and so 
when B is more powerful than A, A might be unable to exempt sectors with higher levels 
of trade creation. 
We explore both of these potential explanations in Table 3. As described in 
Section III, the approach we take is to include interaction terms of the third country share 
with various country characteristics. The first column of Table 3 essentially repeats the 
split sample analysis from Table 2 but by including an interaction between the third 
country share and a high income indicator rather than considering high- and non-high-
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income countries separately. These estimates are consistent with Table 2 in implying a 
negative effect for high income countries and a positive one for the rest of the sample. 
The second column of Table 3 introduces an interaction term between the third 
country share and a variable that indicates whether a country is or is not highly reliant on 
tariff revenue. We code a country as having a high tariff reliance if it obtains more than 
5% of government revenue through trade taxes. We obtain information on tariff reliance 
from the IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Database. Our estimates indicate a more 
positive effect of the third country share on the probability of a product being excluded 
when the country relies more on tariff revenue. This is consistent with the idea that 
countries that rely more on tariffs might have a stronger incentive to avoid causing 
substantial trade diversion. The magnitude or significance of the high-income interaction 
does not change substantially, however, suggesting that these tariff revenue 
considerations do not fully account for the differential effect for high-income countries. 
The third and fourth columns include interactions of the third country share with 
whether the partner country is high income and whether the partner (i.e. the exporter) is 
larger than the importer, respectively. Both a high income partner and a larger partner 
should be expected to have higher negotiating power and so allow us to explore the 
bargaining power explanation for our results discussed above. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, we see that the coefficients on these terms are positive and significant. This 
means that countries are less likely to protect trade creating sectors when their partner is 
richer or relatively large. Since a greater degree of trade creation vs. trade diversion is 
desirable from a welfare perspective, these results are somewhat ironic in suggesting that 
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countries with more negotiating power are likely to end up with less beneficial – or more 
possibly harmful -- trade agreements as a result. 
The last column reports the results of a regression that simultaneously includes all 
of the interaction terms. We see that our overall results are consistent with what we find 
when we include each interaction term separately. Taken together, these results imply a 
substantial variation across countries in the relationship between the third country share 
and whether a product is excluded or not. This variation is consistent with the importance 
of both negotiating power and tariff revenue considerations. 
While our results from Tables 3 and 4 explore whether the relationship between 
the third country share and the likelihood of a product being excluded varies depending 
on the income level of the importer, Table 5 considers the importance of both the 
importer and the exporter’s income level. We specifically divide our observations into 
four categories depending on the income level of the bilateral pair:  (1) high income 
importer and exporter (i.e. North-North), (2) high income importer and non-high income 
exporter (i.e. North-South), (3) non-high income importer and high income exporter (i.e. 
South-North) and (4) non-high income importer and exporter (i.e. South-South). The 
results for each subsample is reported in the first four columns of Table 5.  
We see a strong negative relationship between the third country share and 
exclusion for North-South agreements, a positive relationship for South-South and South-
North agreements and no significant effect for North-North agreements. This pattern is 
consistent with our interpretation of the results from Tables 2 and 3 since we see strong 
evidence for trade creating products being excluded from FTAs specifically when we 
have a high-income importer entering into an agreement with a non-high income 
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exporter, something we would expect to be the case if exclusions are primarily 
determined by interest groups in the country with more negotiating power. The last 
column of Table 4 uses interaction terms instead of a sample split and also includes the 
other interaction terms we considered in Table 3. The results from this column are 
consistent with those from Table 3 as well as from the other columns of Table 4. 
Table 5 repeats some of our key regressions with product fixed effects in addition 
to the importer-exporter fixed effects. These fixed effects allow us to control for factors 
that make certain products more likely to cause trade creation vs. diversion across a range 
of importer-exporter pairs. It would therefore control for variations in the demand or 
export supply elasticities to the extent that these are similar for a product across 
destinations, and hence bring us closer to directly capturing the trade creation relative to 
trade diversion expression given by (22). We can see from Table 5 that the inclusion of 
these additional fixed effects does not substantially affect any of the results we 
described earlier. 
As discussed in Section IV, in calculating our third country share measure, we 
exclude trade with countries that are already in an FTA with the importer in question. The 
rationale for this choice is that the new FTA would not properly speaking cause trade 
diversion from the old FTA partner but would instead be reversing some existing trade 
diversion. As an additional robustness test, Table 6 reports the results regressions where 
we use the importer’s share of overall trade, i.e. including trade with past FTA members 
in the denominator. We can see that these results are consistent with those obtained using 
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our baseline measure. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the third country share 
measure used in Table 6 has a correlation of about 0.87 with our baseline measure. 
Table 7 reports the results of an additional robustness test where we drop E.U. 
countries as exporters. In our baseline analysis, we dropped E.U. countries as an importer 
but included E.U. countries as exporters since a customs union implies a common 
external tariff but not necessarily that foreign countries will impose the same tariff rate on 
each customs union partner. The inclusion of E.U. countries as exporters does however 
mean that the E.U. shows up in our baseline regressions in a relatively large number of 
observations. Table 7 shows that dropping E.U. does not substantially affect our results. 
The only exception is that coefficient on the interaction between the third country share 
and the binary variable which indicates whether the exporter is larger than the importer or 
not is no longer statistically significant. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 In the paper we set out to understand the extent to which countries leave some 
tariffs positive in FTAs, exempting them from the GATT/WTO requirement that most 
tariffs be removed.  Our initial expectation was that countries would exempt sectors 
where they expected the FTA to be primarily trade creating, since that would cause 
disruption of the domestic import-competing industry and harm to firms and workers 
there.  Thus exempted sectors would be primarily what we called “sensitive.”   
 Our empirical analysis, based on data from 37 importing countries and 240 
importer-exporter pairs within FTAs, found the opposite when we did not control for 
country characteristics.  Separating the sample into high- and low-income countries, and 
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also by controlling of country income in an interaction term, we found the expected 
tendency for exempted sectors to be trade creating in high-income countries, but the 
opposite in low-income countries.  To explain the latter, we also included variables to 
indicate government reliance on tariff revenue and differences in country size that might 
reflect bargaining power.  The results of both suggested that poor countries exempt 
sectors where loss of tariff revenue would be a concern and where the bargaining power 
of FTA partners would be important. 
 The perhaps surprising implication of all of this is that high income countries tend 
to undermine the overall beneficial effects of their FTAs by exempting sensitive sectors 
from the tariff cuts, but that low-income countries do the opposite, and may even do so in 
response to pressure brought upon them by their richer or larger FTA partners.  Thus it 
seems to be more likely that the small, poor countries gain more, or are more likely to 
gain at all, from the FTAs that they enter into because of their different choice of 
exempted sectors.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Importer Fraction Exc. 
Products 
Fraction Exc. 
Trade 
# of 
Partners 
Earliest 
FTA 
Latest 
FTA 
ALB 0.09 0.26 7 2002 2004 
AUS 0.24 0.15 2 2005 2005 
BIH 0.15 0.14 5 2002 2004 
CAN 0.06 0.03 1 2002 2002 
CHE 0.10 0.05 9 1999 2005 
CHL 0.05 0.05 26 2002 2004 
CRI 0.24 0.46 3 2002 2002 
DOM 0.09 0.15 5 2001 2002 
DZA 0.06 0.16 14 1998 1999 
GTM 0.14 0.15 2 2001 2001 
HND 0.14 0.26 2 2001 2001 
HRV 0.11 0.05 30 1998 2004 
IDN 0.01 0.01 1 1999 1999 
IND 0.20 0.25 1 2001 2001 
ISR 0.14 0.11 9 1998 2004 
JPN 0.20 0.05 2 2002 2005 
KOR 0.19 0.03 1 2004 2004 
LKA 0.21 0.34 2 2001 2005 
MAR 0.11 0.21 14 1998 1999 
MDA 0.11 0.54 4 2004 2004 
MEX 0.06 0.04 28 1998 2004 
MKD 0.30 0.55 28 2000 2004 
MOZ 0.06 0.09 7 2000 2000 
MUS 0.06 0.12 3 2000 2001 
MWI 0.03 0.35 1 2000 2000 
MYS 0.28 0.27 1 1999 1999 
NIC 0.07 0.23 2 1998 2002 
NOR 0.24 0.29 9 1999 2005 
NZL 0.16 0.05 2 2001 2005 
PAN 0.26 0.26 2 2003 2004 
PHL 0.44 0.84 1 1999 1999 
SLV 0.28 0.41 3 2001 2003 
SRB 0.16 0.00 5 2004 2004 
UKR 0.18 0.04 1 2001 2001 
USA 0.10 0.05 3 2001 2005 
VNM 0.43 0.00 1 1999 1999 
ZMB 0.23 0.32 3 2000 2001 
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Table 2:   Baseline Regressions 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: Exempted Sector Indicator 
              
Third country share 0.065*** -0.195*** 0.076***    
 (0.007) (0.032) (0.007)    
Third country share (combined)    0.056*** -0.204*** 0.060*** 
    (0.008) (0.034) (0.008) 
       
Observations 112,378 34,796 77,582 243,822 38,654 205,168 
R-squared 0.209 0.074 0.259 0.190 0.076 0.207 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All 
High 
Income 
Not High 
Income All 
High 
Income 
Not High 
Income 
Standard errors are clustered at the importer-product level     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
 
Table 3:   Regressions with Interaction Terms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent Variable: Exempted Sector Indicator 
            
Third country share 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.036*** 0.002 -0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Third country share x high income -0.271*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.245*** -0.225*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Third country share x high tariff reliance  0.029**   0.077*** 
  (0.015)   (0.016) 
Third country share x high income partner   0.065***  0.065*** 
   (0.012)  (0.015) 
Third country share x exporter larger    0.105*** 0.077*** 
    (0.011) (0.013) 
      
Observations 112,378 112,378 112,378 111,603 111,603 
R-squared 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.212 0.212 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All All All All All 
Standard errors are clustered at the importer-product level    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 4:   Samples split based on income level of both importer and exporter 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: Exempted Sector Indicator 
            
Third country share -0.049 -0.343*** 0.097*** 0.042*** -0.095** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.010) (0.008) (0.043) 
Third country share x North from South     -0.273*** 
     (0.061) 
Third country share x South from North     0.116*** 
     (0.044) 
Third country share x South from South     0.067 
     (0.045) 
Third country share x high tariff reliance     0.068*** 
     (0.016) 
Third country share x exporter larger     0.081*** 
     (0.013) 
      
Observations 8,901 25,895 47,110 30,472 111,603 
R-squared 0.036 0.076 0.329 0.148 0.213 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
North-
North 
North-
South 
South-
North 
South-
South All 
Standard errors are clustered at the importer-product level    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Table 5:   Regressions with Product Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent Variable: Exempted Sector Indicator 
          
Third country share 0.053*** -0.133*** 0.062*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.028) (0.006) (0.010) 
Third country share x high income    -0.177*** 
    (0.028) 
Third country share x high tariff reliance    0.056*** 
    (0.015) 
Third country share x high income partner    0.048*** 
    (0.014) 
Third country share x exporter larger    0.060*** 
    (0.012) 
     
Observations 112,295 34,425 77,366 111,521 
R-squared 0.399 0.410 0.446 0.403 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All 
High 
Income 
Not High 
Income All 
Standard errors are clustered at the importer-product level   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 6:   Regressions with Third Country Share Including Past FTA Partners 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent Variable: Exempted Sector Indicator 
          
Third country share (inc.) 0.073*** -0.206*** 0.089*** -0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.032) (0.007) (0.010) 
Third country share (inc.) x high income    -0.244*** 
    (0.032) 
Third country share (inc.)  x high tariff reliance    0.103*** 
    (0.017) 
Third country share (inc.)  x high income partner    0.079*** 
    (0.016) 
Third country share (inc.)  x exporter larger    0.088*** 
    (0.014) 
     
Observations 112,378 34,796 77,582 111,603 
R-squared 0.209 0.074 0.259 0.212 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All 
High 
Income 
Not High 
Income All 
Standard errors are clustered at the importer-product level   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
  
Table 7:   Regressions Excluding E.U. countries as exporters 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent Variable: Exempted Sector Indicator 
          
Third country share 0.035*** -0.222*** 0.053*** -0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.037) (0.008) (0.009) 
Third country share x high income    -0.252*** 
    (0.038) 
Third country share x high tariff reliance    0.112*** 
    (0.018) 
Third country share x high income partner    0.140*** 
    (0.024) 
Third country share x exporter larger    0.017 
    (0.018) 
     
Observations 66,258 30,868 35,390 65,483 
R-squared 0.120 0.082 0.149 0.124 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All 
High 
Income 
Not High 
Income All 
Standard errors are clustered at the importer-product level   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix A:  Three Country Model 
 
The Model 
 This is a partial equilibrium model of three countries, A, B, and C, trading a 
homogeneous good subject potentially to bilateral tariffs.  Unspecified domestic supply 
and demand functions in each country, 𝑖, are linear, giving rise to linear functions for 
each country’s supply of exports, 𝑋𝑖 ,and demand for imports, 𝑀𝑖: 
 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖),          𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶,         𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑎𝑖 (A-1) 
 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖),         𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶,         𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 (A-2) 
where 𝑎𝑖 is the autarky price in country 𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 is the slope parameter, positively related 
to the elasticities of supply of exports and demand for imports.  From (A-1, A-2) 
 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 0         ⇒          𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖/𝑏𝑖 (A-3) 
 𝑀𝑖 ≥ 0        ⇒          𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑀𝑖/𝑏𝑖 (A-4) 
 We assume that initial conditions are such that both countries B and C export 
positive amounts to A, both under an initial MFN tariff and also under an FTA between 
A and B.  Let 𝑡𝑖 be the specific tariff levied by Country A on imports from Country 𝑖, 𝑖 =
𝐵, 𝐶.  Thus we assume that 
 𝑎𝐴 > 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑡𝑖  ,   𝑖 = 𝐵, 𝐶 (A-5) 
Therefore there will be positive exports from both countries to A and the following must 
hold: 
 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝐴 − 𝑡𝑖 ,   𝑖 = 𝐵, 𝐶 (A-6) 
In equilibrium 
 𝑀𝐴 = 𝑋𝐵 + 𝑋𝐶 (A-7) 
 Given exogenous tariffs and the parameters 𝑎𝑖 ,  𝑏𝑖, substituting (A-1) and (A-2) 
into (A-7) gives three equations (two in (A-6) and one in (A-7)) for the three unknown 
prices in each country.   
 
Solution of the Model: 
 Substituting (A-1), (A-2), and (A-6) into (A-7): 
 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑝𝐴) = 𝑏𝐵(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑡𝐵 − 𝑎𝐵) + 𝑏𝐶(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑡𝐶 − 𝑎𝐶) (A-8) 
which rearranges to 
 (𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝐵 + 𝑏𝐶𝑎𝐶) + (𝑏𝐵𝑡𝐵 + 𝑏𝐶𝑡𝐶) = (𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏𝐶)𝑝𝐴 (A-9) 
Let 
 𝛽 = 𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏𝐶 (A-10a) 
 𝛾 = 𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝐵 + 𝑏𝐶𝑎𝐶 (A-10b) 
Then in equilibrium  
 𝑝𝐴 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐵𝑡𝐵+𝑏𝐶𝑡𝐶
𝛽
 (A-11) 
 Note that the 𝑎𝑖 are the autarky prices in the respective countries.  From (A-10) 
and (A-11), if tariffs are both zero, then prices (in all countries, since they are then equal) 
are a weighted average of the autarky prices, since 𝛾 𝛽⁄  is the sum of the 𝑎𝑖 each 
multiplied by its respective 𝑏𝑖 as a fraction of the sum of the all 𝑏𝑖’s.  Since the 𝑏𝑖 tell the 
quantity of each country’s trade for a given gap between trade price and autarky price, 
they mainly reflect the countries’ sizes. 
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 Solving for the other prices as well as quantities, we have: 
 𝑝𝐵 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐵𝑡𝐵+𝑏𝐶𝑡𝐶
𝛽
− 𝑡𝐵 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐶𝑡𝐶
𝛽
−
𝛽−𝑏𝐵
𝛽
𝑡𝐵   (A-12) 
 𝑝𝐶 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐵𝑡𝐵+𝑏𝐶𝑡𝐶
𝛽
− 𝑡𝐶 =
𝛾
𝛽
+
𝑏𝐵𝑡𝐵
𝛽
−
𝛽−𝑏𝐶
𝛽
𝑡𝐶   (A-13) 
 𝑀𝐴 = 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑝𝐴) =  
𝑏𝐴[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑎𝐵−𝑡𝐵)+𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐴−𝑎𝐶−𝑡𝐶)]
𝛽
 (A-14) 
 𝑋𝐵 = 𝑏𝑩(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑎𝐵) =
𝑏𝑩[𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴–𝑎𝐵–𝑡𝐵)+𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐶+𝑡𝐶–𝑎𝐵–𝑡𝐵)]
𝛽
 (A-15) 
 𝑋𝐶 = 𝑏𝑪(𝑝𝐶 − 𝑎𝐶) =
𝑏𝑪[𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴–𝑎𝐶–𝑡𝐶)+𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐵+𝑡𝐵–𝑎𝐶–𝑡𝐶)]
𝛽
 (A-16) 
Note that, as must be, (A-15) and (A-16) add to (A-14).   
 Finally we use (A-15) and (A-16) to calculate country A’s revenue from its 
tariffs: 
 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑡𝐵𝑋𝐵 + 𝑡𝐶𝑋𝐶  
= 𝑡𝐵
𝑏𝑩(𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴– 𝑎𝐵– 𝑡𝐵) + 𝑏𝐶(𝑎𝐶 + 𝑡𝐶– 𝑎𝐵– 𝑡𝐵))
𝛽
 
+𝑡𝐶
𝑏𝑪(𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐴– 𝑎𝐶– 𝑡𝐶) + 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐵 + 𝑡𝐵– 𝑎𝐶– 𝑡𝐶))
𝛽
 
 (A-17) 
Domestic Markets  
 For some purposes it is helpful to relate these results to the domestic supply, 
𝑆𝑖, and demand, 𝐷𝑖 , functions that underlie (A-1, A-2).   Suppose that these are linear 
as follows, for all 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶: 
 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖),        𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑖 (A-18a) 
 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖(𝑚𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖),        𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑖 (A-18b) 
where 𝑠𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 > 0 are slope parameters and 𝑐𝑖, 𝑚𝑖 > 0 are intercepts.  Equating these, 
we get the autarky price. 
 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝐴 =
𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑖
𝑠𝑖+𝑑𝑖
,      (A-19) 
And letting 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 = −𝑀𝑖 we get 
 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖 ,      (A-20) 
 
Country Size 
 To deal with country size, we add the following assumption about the 
composition of industries in each country:  Let the industry in each country be 
composed of a large number 𝑛𝑖 of competitive suppliers, each with the same supply 
curve 𝜎(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖). Thus the slope parameter of all firms in all countries is the same, 𝜎, 
and the firms differ across countries only in their cost intercepts, 𝑐𝑖.  The industry 
domestic supply curve is therefore 
 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖𝜎(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖),        𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑖  (A-21) 
Assume too that demanders in all countries also share a single slope parameter,  𝛿, 
and differ across countries only in their intercepts, 𝑚𝑖.  And assume that the 
numbers of demanders in each country are a common multiple, Γ, of 𝑛𝑖.  Then the 
industry domestic demand curve is  
 𝐷𝑖 = Γ𝑛𝑖𝛿(𝑚𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖),        𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑖 (A-22) 
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 With these assumptions, the derivation of autarky equilibrium and trade 
supplies and demands in (A-18 – A-20) above is valid, with  
 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖𝜎 (A-23) 
and  
 𝑑𝑖 = Γ𝑛𝑖𝛿 (A-24) 
From (A-19), the autarky price in country 𝑖 is 
 𝑎𝑖 =
𝑛𝑖𝜎𝑐𝑖+Γ𝑛𝑖𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝑛𝑖𝜎+Γ𝑛𝑖𝛿
=  
𝜎𝑐𝑖+Γ𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝜎+Γ𝛿
   (A-25) 
which is independent of the numbers of firms and demanders, and thus independent 
of industry/country size.   
 The slope parameter, 𝑏𝑖, of the export and import functions, however, does 
depend on country size.  From (A-20), (A-23), and (A-24), 
 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖(𝜎 + Γ𝛿) (A-26) 
and the 𝑏𝑖 differ across countries only by size.  Let the units of measurement of 
goods, money, firms, and demanders be chosen so that 𝜎 + Γ𝛿 = 1.  Then we can 
interpret 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 as measuring the size of country i.  And without that normalization 
we can interpret 𝑏𝑖 𝛽⁄  as 
 𝑏𝑖 𝛽⁄ =
𝑛𝑖(𝜎+Γ𝛿)
∑ 𝑛𝑗(𝜎+Γ𝛿)𝑗
=
𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑗
= 𝜃𝑖  (A-27) 
where 𝜃𝑖  is country 𝑖’s share of the world economy. 
 
 
 
 
